AUSTRALIA must do all it can to prepare for an outbreak of foot and mouth disease, writes Dr MARTYN JEGGO

The consequences of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Australia would be devastating for our livestock industries.

It is estimated that a worst-case FMD incursion would cost Australia between $8 billion and $13 billion.

Being prepared to respond to an outbreak of this magnitude, and early recognition of an incursion, are critical and could significantly reduce the impact on the Australian economy and our rural communities.

Whether or not the importation of live foot and mouth disease virus into Australia should be allowed for research causes much debate among Australian scientists and our country's livestock industries.

When the Beale review of Australia's quarantine and biosecurity arrangements was released in December 2008, livestock industry representatives expressed serious concern, particularly about the recommendation that: "The import of positive control samples (including the foot and mouth disease virus) for use in laboratory diagnostic research and capacity building for exotic disease pathogens is vital and should be permitted under strict import permit conditions to laboratories such as the Australian Animal Health Laboratory."

This recommendation is in keeping with the long-held and publicly expressed opinion of expert scientists at CSIRO's Australian Animal Health Laboratory.

However, CSIRO did not request this at the Beale review and presently has no plans to seek government permission to import live FMD virus for research purposes.

Strict quarantine controls have kept Australia FMD-free for many years but if an outbreak occurred such as in the United Kingdom in 2001, the impact on the agricultural sector and Australia's international trade status would be devastating.

Immediate closure of all livestock commodities markets such as meat, wool and dairy products, could equate to a loss of $13 billion during a 12-month outbreak.

There is still much we do not know about FMD and in order to better understand the virus, Australian scientists need to study affected animals and the causative agent.

In many cases, it is possible to use "inactivated" virus and we have been doing this at AAHL for the last 25 years to ensure we could respond effectively to an FMD outbreak.

However, in order to rapidly develop the best possible diagnostic tools and to better understand how the virus affects Australia's livestock animals, scientists really do need to work with live virus.

To help maintain a capability in this area, scientists at AAHL are actively involved in off-shore FMD research in several countries where FMD already exists, including Laos and Vietnam.

This support not only reduces the disease risks to the countries themselves but also assists the preparedness of Australian biosecurity through better threat assessment and management.

Should importation of live FMD virus occur at some stage in the future, AAHL is presently the only Australian facility designed and equipped to work safely work with it, at the necessary high bio-containment level.

AAHL was custom-built and is without a doubt the world's most advanced and most sophisticated high containment laboratory.

I wish to reassure Australia's livestock industries that CSIRO recognises the legitimate concerns about importing live FMD. Presently, CSIRO does not plan to seek approval to import live FMD virus.

If this position was to change, CSIRO would work with the Australian Government and undertake wide consultation with the livestock industries and other concerned parties.